11.10.21

Our constitutional crisis is already here

 https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/09/23/robert-kagan-constitutional-crisis/

Opinion: Our constitutional crisis is already here



(Anthony Gerace for The Washington Post; photos by Getty Images)

“Is there no virtue among us? If there be not, we are in a wretched situation.”

— James Madison

The United States is heading into its greatest political and constitutional crisis since the Civil War, with a reasonable chance over the next three to four years of incidents of mass violence, a breakdown of federal authority, and the division of the country into warring red and blue enclaves.

The warning signs may be obscured by the distractions of politics, the pandemic, the economy and global crises, and by wishful thinking and denial. But about these things there should be no doubt:

First, Donald Trump will be the Republican candidate for president in 2024. The hope and expectation that he would fade in visibility and influence have been delusional. He enjoys mammoth leads in the polls; he is building a massive campaign war chest; and at this moment the Democratic ticket looks vulnerable. Barring health problems, he is running.

Second, Trump and his Republican allies are actively preparing to ensure his victory by whatever means necessary. Trump’s charges of fraud in the 2020 election are now primarily aimed at establishing the predicate to challenge future election results that do not go his way. Some Republican candidates have already begun preparing to declare fraud in 2022, just as Larry Elder tried meekly to do in the California recall contest.

Meanwhile, the amateurish “stop the steal” efforts of 2020 have given way to an organized nationwide campaign to ensure that Trump and his supporters will have the control over state and local election officials that they lacked in 2020. Those recalcitrant Republican state officials who effectively saved the country from calamity by refusing to falsely declare fraud or to “find” more votes for Trump are being systematically removed or hounded from office. Republican legislatures are giving themselves greater control over the election certification process. As of this spring, Republicans have proposed or passed measures in at least 16 states that would shift certain election authorities from the purview of the governor, secretary of state or other executive-branch officers to the legislature. An Arizona bill flatly states that the legislature may “revoke the secretary of state’s issuance or certification of a presidential elector’s certificate of election” by a simple majority vote. Some state legislatures seek to impose criminal penalties on local election officials alleged to have committed “technical infractions,” including obstructing the view of poll watchers.

The stage is thus being set for chaos. Imagine weeks of competing mass protests across multiple states as lawmakers from both parties claim victory and charge the other with unconstitutional efforts to take power. Partisans on both sides are likely to be better armed and more willing to inflict harm than they were in 2020. Would governors call out the National Guard? Would President Biden nationalize the Guard and place it under his control, invoke the Insurrection Act, and send troops into Pennsylvania or Texas or Wisconsin to quell violent protests? Deploying federal power in the states would be decried as tyranny. Biden would find himself where other presidents have been — where Andrew Jackson was during the nullification crisis, or where Abraham Lincoln was after the South seceded — navigating without rules or precedents, making his own judgments about what constitutional powers he does and doesn’t have.

Today’s arguments over the filibuster will seem quaint in three years if the American political system enters a crisis for which the Constitution offers no remedy.

Most Americans — and all but a handful of politicians — have refused to take this possibility seriously enough to try to prevent it. As has so often been the case in other countries where fascist leaders arise, their would-be opponents are paralyzed in confusion and amazement at this charismatic authoritarian. They have followed the standard model of appeasement, which always begins with underestimation. The political and intellectual establishments in both parties have been underestimating Trump since he emerged on the scene in 2015. They underestimated the extent of his popularity and the strength of his hold on his followers; they underestimated his ability to take control of the Republican Party; and then they underestimated how far he was willing to go to retain power. The fact that he failed to overturn the 2020 election has reassured many that the American system remains secure, though it easily could have gone the other way — if Biden had not been safely ahead in all four states where the vote was close; if Trump had been more competent and more in control of the decision-makers in his administration, Congress and the states. As it was, Trump came close to bringing off a coup earlier this year. All that prevented it was a handful of state officials with notable courage and integrity, and the reluctance of two attorneys general and a vice president to obey orders they deemed inappropriate.

These were not the checks and balances the Framers had in mind when they designed the Constitution, of course, but Trump has exposed the inadequacy of those protections. The Founders did not foresee the Trump phenomenon, in part because they did not foresee national parties. They anticipated the threat of a demagogue, but not of a national cult of personality. They assumed that the new republic’s vast expanse and the historic divisions among the 13 fiercely independent states would pose insuperable barriers to national movements based on party or personality. “Petty” demagogues might sway their own states, where they were known and had influence, but not the whole nation with its diverse populations and divergent interests.

Such checks and balances as the Framers put in place, therefore, depended on the separation of the three branches of government, each of which, they believed, would zealously guard its own power and prerogatives. The Framers did not establish safeguards against the possibility that national-party solidarity would transcend state boundaries because they did not imagine such a thing was possible. Nor did they foresee that members of Congress, and perhaps members of the judicial branch, too, would refuse to check the power of a president from their own party.



(Illustration by Anthony Gerace for The Washington Post; photos by Getty Images)

In recent decades, however, party loyalty has superseded branch loyalty, and never more so than in the Trump era. As the two Trump impeachments showed, if members of Congress are willing to defend or ignore the president’s actions simply because he is their party leader, then conviction and removal become all but impossible. In such circumstances, the Framers left no other check against usurpation by the executive — except (small-r) republican virtue.

Critics and supporters alike have consistently failed to recognize what a unique figure Trump is in American history. Because his followers share fundamentally conservative views, many see Trump as merely the continuation, and perhaps the logical culmination, of the Reagan Revolution. This is a mistake: Although most Trump supporters are or have become Republicans, they hold a set of beliefs that were not necessarily shared by all Republicans. Some Trump supporters are former Democrats and independents. In fact, the passions that animate the Trump movement are as old as the republic and have found a home in both parties at one time or another.

Suspicion of and hostility toward the federal government; racial hatred and fear; a concern that modern, secular society undermines religion and traditional morality; economic anxiety in an age of rapid technological change; class tensions, with subtle condescension on one side and resentment on the other; distrust of the broader world, especially Europe, and its insidious influence in subverting American freedom — such views and attitudes have been part of the fabric of U.S. politics since the anti-Federalists, the Whiskey Rebellion and Thomas Jefferson. The Democratic Party was the home of white supremacists until they jumped to George Wallace in 1968 and later to the Republicans. Liberals and Democrats in particular need to distinguish between their ongoing battle with Republican policies and the challenge posed by Trump and his followers. One can be fought through the processes of the constitutional system; the other is an assault on the Constitution itself.

What makes the Trump movement historically unique is not its passions and paranoias. It is the fact that for millions of Americans, Trump himself is the response to their fears and resentments. This is a stronger bond between leader and followers than anything seen before in U.S. political movements. Although the Founders feared the rise of a king or a Caesar, for two centuries Americans proved relatively immune to unwavering hero-worship of politicians. Their men on horseback — Theodore Roosevelt, Grant, even Washington — were not regarded as infallible. This was true of great populist leaders as well. William Jennings Bryan a century ago was venerated because he advanced certain ideas and policies, but he did not enjoy unquestioning loyalty from his followers. Even Reagan was criticized by conservatives for selling out conservative principles, for deficit spending, for his equivocal stance on abortion, for being “soft” on the Soviet Union.

Trump is different, which is one reason the political system has struggled to understand, much less contain, him. The American liberal worldview tends to search for material and economic explanations for everything, and no doubt a good number of Trump supporters have grounds to complain about their lot in life. But their bond with Trump has little to do with economics or other material concerns. They believe the U.S. government and society have been captured by socialists, minority groups and sexual deviants. They see the Republican Party establishment as corrupt and weak — “losers,” to use Trump’s word, unable to challenge the reigning liberal hegemony. They view Trump as strong and defiant, willing to take on the establishment, Democrats, RINOs, liberal media, antifa, the Squad, Big Tech and the “Mitch McConnell Republicans.” His charismatic leadership has given millions of Americans a feeling of purpose and empowerment, a new sense of identity. While Trump’s critics see him as too narcissistic to be any kind of leader, his supporters admire his unapologetic, militant selfishness. Unlike establishment Republicans, Trump speaks without embarrassment on behalf of an aggrieved segment of Americans, not exclusively White, who feel they have been taking it on the chin for too long. And that is all he needs to do.

There was a time when political analysts wondered what would happen when Trump failed to “deliver” for his constituents. But the most important thing Trump delivers is himself. His egomania is part of his appeal. In his professed victimization by the media and the “elites,” his followers see their own victimization. That is why attacks on Trump by the elites only strengthen his bond with his followers. That is why millions of Trump supporters have even been willing to risk death as part of their show of solidarity: When Trump’s enemies cited his mishandling of the pandemic to discredit him, their answer was to reject the pandemic. One Trump supporter didn’t go to the hospital after developing covid-19 symptoms because he didn’t want to contribute to the liberal case against Trump. “I’m not going to add to the numbers,” he told a reporter.

Because the Trump movement is less about policies than about Trump himself, it has undermined the normal role of American political parties, which is to absorb new political and ideological movements into the mainstream. Bryan never became president, but some of his populist policies were adopted by both political parties. Sen. Bernie Sanders’s supporters might not have wanted Biden for president, but having lost the nomination battle they could work on getting Biden to pursue their agenda. Liberal democracy requires acceptance of adverse electoral results, a willingness to countenance the temporary rule of those with whom we disagree. As historian Richard Hofstadter observed, it requires that people “endure error in the interest of social peace.” Part of that willingness stems from the belief that the democratic system makes it possible to work, even in opposition, to correct the ruling party’s errors and overreach. Movements based on ideas and policies can also quickly shift their allegiances. Today, the progressives’ flag-bearer might be Sanders, but tomorrow it could be Sen. Elizabeth Warren or Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez or someone else.

For a movement built around a cult of personality, these adjustments are not possible. For Trump supporters, the “error” is that Trump was cheated out of reelection by what he has told them is an oppressive, communist, Democrat regime. While the defeat of a sitting president normally leads to a struggle to claim the party’s mantle, so far no Republican has been able to challenge Trump’s grip on Republican voters: not Sen. Josh Hawley, not Sen. Tom Cotton, not Tucker Carlson, not Gov. Ron DeSantis. It is still all about Trump. The fact that he is not in office means that the United States is “a territory controlled by enemy tribes,” writes one conservative intellectual. The government, as one Trump supporter put it, “is monopolized by a Regime that believes [Trump voters] are beneath representation, and will observe no limits to keep them [from] getting it." If so, the intellectual posits, what choice do they have but to view the government as the enemy and to become “united and armed to take care of themselves as they think best”?



(Illustration by Anthony Gerace for The Washington Post; photos by Getty Images)

The Trump movement might not have begun as an insurrection, but it became one after its leader claimed he had been cheated out of reelection. For Trump supporters, the events of Jan. 6 were not an embarrassing debacle but a patriotic effort to save the nation, by violent action if necessary. As one 56-year-old Michigan woman explained: “We weren’t there to steal things. We weren’t there to do damage. We were just there to overthrow the government.”

The banal normalcy of the great majority of Trump’s supporters, including those who went to the Capitol on Jan. 6, has befuddled many observers. Although private militia groups and white supremacists played a part in the attack, 90 percent of those arrested or charged had no ties to such groups. The majority were middle-class and middle-aged; 40 percent were business owners or white-collar workers. They came mostly from purple, not red, counties.

Most Trump supporters are good parents, good neighbors and solid members of their communities. Their bigotry, for the most part, is typical white American bigotry, perhaps with an added measure of resentment and a less filtered mode of expression since Trump arrived on the scene. But these are normal people in the sense that they think and act as people have for centuries. They put their trust in family, tribe, religion and race. Although zealous in defense of their own rights and freedoms, they are less concerned about the rights and freedoms of those who are not like them. That, too, is not unusual. What is unnatural is to value the rights of others who are unlike you as much as you value your own.

As it happens, however, that is what the American experiment in republican democracy requires. It is what the Framers meant by “republican virtue,” a love of freedom not only for oneself but also as an abstract, universal good; a love of self-government as an ideal; a commitment to abide by the laws passed by legitimate democratic processes; and a healthy fear of and vigilance against tyranny of any kind. Even James Madison, who framed the Constitution on the assumption that people would always pursue their selfish interests, nevertheless argued that it was “chimerical” to believe that any form of government could “secure liberty and happiness without any virtue in the people.” Al Gore and his supporters displayed republican virtue when they abided by the Supreme Court’s judgment in 2000 despite the partisan nature of the justices’ decision. (Whether the court itself displayed republican virtue is another question.)

The events of Jan. 6, on the other hand, proved that Trump and his most die-hard supporters are prepared to defy constitutional and democratic norms, just as revolutionary movements have in the past. While it might be shocking to learn that normal, decent Americans can support a violent assault on the Capitol, it shows that Americans as a people are not as exceptional as their founding principles and institutions. Europeans who joined fascist movements in the 1920s and 1930s were also from the middle classes. No doubt many of them were good parents and neighbors, too. People do things as part of a mass movement that they would not do as individuals, especially if they are convinced that others are out to destroy their way of life.

It would be foolish to imagine that the violence of Jan. 6 was an aberration that will not be repeated. Because Trump supporters see those events as a patriotic defense of the nation, there is every reason to expect more such episodes. Trump has returned to the explosive rhetoric of that day, insisting that he won in a “landslide,” that the “radical left Democrat communist party” stole the presidency in the “most corrupt, dishonest, and unfair election in the history of our country” and that they have to give it back. He has targeted for defeat those Republicans who voted for his impeachment — or criticized him for his role in the riot. Already, there have been threats to bomb polling sites, kidnap officials and attack state capitols. “You and your family will be killed very slowly,” the wife of Georgia’s top election official was texted earlier this year. Nor can one assume that the Three Percenters and Oath Keepers would again play a subordinate role when the next riot unfolds. Veterans who assaulted the Capitol told police officers that they had fought for their country before and were fighting for it again. Looking ahead to 2022 and 2024, Trump insists “there is no way they win elections without cheating. There’s no way.” So, if the results come in showing another Democratic victory, Trump’s supporters will know what to do. Just as “generations of patriots” gave “their sweat, their blood and even their very lives” to build America, Trump tells them, so today “we have no choice. We have to fight” to restore “our American birthright.”

How the Capitol attack unfolded, from inside Trump's rally to the riot | Opinion
Early on Jan. 6, The Post's Kate Woodsome saw signs of violence hours before thousands of President Trump's loyalists besieged the Capitol. (Joy Yi, Kate Woodsome/The Washington Post)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Where does the Republican Party stand in all this? The party gave birth to and nurtured this movement; it bears full responsibility for establishing the conditions in which Trump could capture the loyalty of 90 percent of Republican voters. Republican leaders were more than happy to ride Trump’s coattails if it meant getting paid off with hundreds of conservative court appointments, including three Supreme Court justices; tax cuts; immigration restrictions; and deep reductions in regulations on business. Yet Trump’s triumph also had elements of a hostile takeover. The movement’s passion was for Trump, not the party. GOP primary voters chose Trump over the various flavors of establishment Republicanism (Jeb Bush, Marco Rubio), and after Trump’s election they continued to regard establishment Republicans as enemies. Longtime party heroes like Paul Ryan were cast into oblivion for disparaging Trump. Even staunch supporters such as Jeff Sessions eventually became villains when they would not do as Trump demanded. Those who survived had a difficult balancing act: to use Trump’s appeal to pass the Republican agenda while also controlling Trump’s excesses, which they worried could ultimately threaten the party’s interests.

That plan seemed plausible in 2017. Unlike other insurgent leaders, Trump had not spent time in the political wilderness building a party and surrounding himself with loyalists. He had to choose from an existing pool of Republican officials, who varied in their willingness to do his bidding. The GOP establishment hoped that the presence of “adults” would restrain him, protecting their traditional agenda and, in their view, the country’s interests, from his worst instincts.

This was a miscalculation. Trump’s grip on his supporters left no room for an alternative power center in the party. One by one, the “adults” resigned or were run off. The dissent and contrary opinions that exist in every party — the Northeast moderate Republicans in Reagan’s day; the progressives in today’s Democratic Party — disappeared from Trump’s Republican Party. The only real issue was Trump himself, and on that there could be no dissent. Those who disapproved of Trump could either keep silent or leave.

The takeover extended beyond the level of political leadership. Modern political parties are an ecosystem of interest groups, lobby organizations, job seekers, campaign donors and intellectuals. All have a stake in the party’s viability; all ultimately depend on being roughly aligned with wherever the party is at a given moment; and so all had to make their peace with Trump, too. Conservative publications that once opposed him as unfit for the presidency had to reverse course or lose readership and funding. Pundits had to adjust to the demands of their pro-Trump audiences — and were rewarded handsomely when they did. Donors who had opposed Trump during the primaries fell into line, if only to preserve some influence on the issues that mattered to them. Advocacy organizations that had previously seen their role as holding the Republican Party to certain principles, and thus often dissented from the party leadership, either became advocates for Trump or lost clout.

It was no surprise that elected officials feared taking on the Trump movement and that Republican job seekers either kept silent about their views or made show-trial-like apologies for past criticism. Ambition is a powerful antidote to moral qualms. More revealing was the behavior of Republican elder statesmen, former secretaries of state in their 80s or 90s who had no further ambitions for high office and seemingly nothing to lose by speaking out. Despite their known abhorrence of everything Trump stood for, these old lions refused to criticize him. They were unwilling to come out against a Republican Party to which they had devoted their professional lives, even when the party was led by someone they detested. Whatever they thought about Trump, moreover, Republican elders disliked Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama and the Democrats more. Again, this is not so unusual. German conservatives accommodated Adolf Hitler in large part because they opposed the socialists more than they opposed the Nazis, who, after all, shared many of their basic prejudices. As for conservative intellectuals, even those who had spent years arguing that Woodrow Wilson was a tyrant because he created the Federal Reserve and supported child labor laws seemed to have no concerns about whether Trump was a would-be despot. They not only came to Trump’s defense but fashioned political doctrines to justify his rule, filling in the wide gaps of his nonexistent ideology with an appeal to “conservative nationalism” and conservative populism. Perhaps American conservatism was never comfortable with the American experiment in liberal democracy, but certainly since Trump took over their party, many conservatives have revealed a hostility to core American beliefs.

 (Illustration by Anthony Gerace for The Washington Post; photos by Getty Images)

All this has left few dissenting voices within the Republican ecosystem. The Republican Party today is a zombie party. Its leaders go through the motions of governing in pursuit of traditional Republican goals, wrestling over infrastructure spending and foreign policy, even as real power in the party has leached away to Trump. From the uneasy and sometimes contentious partnership during Trump’s four years in office, the party’s main if not sole purpose today is as the willing enabler of Trump’s efforts to game the electoral system to ensure his return to power.

With the party firmly under his thumb, Trump is now fighting the Biden administration on separate fronts. One is normal, legitimate political competition, where Republicans criticize Biden’s policies, feed and fight the culture wars, and in general behave like a typical hostile opposition.

The other front is outside the bounds of constitutional and democratic competition and into the realm of illegal or extralegal efforts to undermine the electoral process. The two are intimately related, because the Republican Party has used its institutional power in the political sphere to shield Trump and his followers from the consequences of their illegal and extralegal activities in the lead-up to Jan. 6. Thus, Reps. Kevin McCarthy and Elise Stefanik, in their roles as party leaders, run interference for the Trump movement in the sphere of legitimate politics, while Republicans in lesser positions cheer on the Jan. 6 perpetrators, turning them into martyrs and heroes, and encouraging illegal acts in the future.

This pincer assault has several advantages. Republican politicians and would-be policymakers can play the role of the legitimate opposition. They can rediscover their hawkish internationalist foreign policy (suspended during the Trump years) and their deficit-minded economics (also suspended during the Trump years). They can go on the mainstream Sunday shows and critique the Biden administration on issues such as Afghanistan. They can pretend that Trump is no longer part of the equation. Biden is the president, after all, and his administration is not exactly without faults.

Yet whatever the legitimacy of Republican critiques of Biden, there is a fundamental disingenuousness to it all. It is a dodge. Republicans focus on China and critical race theory and avoid any mention of Trump, even as the party works to fix the next election in his favor. The left hand professes to know nothing of what the right hand is doing.

Even Trump opponents play along. Republicans such as Sens. Mitt Romney and Ben Sasse have condemned the events of Jan. 6, criticized Trump and even voted for his impeachment, but in other respects they continue to act as good Republicans and conservatives. On issues such as the filibuster, Romney and others insist on preserving “regular order” and conducting political and legislative business as usual, even though they know that Trump’s lieutenants in their party are working to subvert the next presidential election.

The result is that even these anti-Trump Republicans are enabling the insurrection. Revolutionary movements usually operate outside a society’s power structures. But the Trump movement also enjoys unprecedented influence within those structures. It dominates the coverage on several cable news networks, numerous conservative magazines, hundreds of talk radio stations and all kinds of online platforms. It has access to financing from rich individuals and the Republican National Committee’s donor pool. And, not least, it controls one of the country’s two national parties. All that is reason enough to expect another challenge, for what movement would fail to take advantage of such favorable circumstances to make a play for power?

 (Illustration by Anthony Gerace for The Washington Post; photos by Getty Images)

Today, we are in a time of hope and illusion. The same people who said that Trump wouldn’t try to overturn the last election now say we have nothing to worry about with the next one. Republicans have been playing this game for five years, first pooh-poohing concerns about Trump’s intentions, or about the likelihood of their being realized, and then going silent, or worse, when what they insisted was improbable came to pass. These days, even the anti-Trump media constantly looks for signs that Trump’s influence might be fading and that drastic measures might not be necessary.

The world will look very different in 14 months if, as seems likely, the Republican zombie party wins control of the House. At that point, with the political winds clearly blowing in his favor, Trump is all but certain to announce his candidacy, and social media constraints on his speech are likely to be lifted, since Facebook and Twitter would have a hard time justifying censoring his campaign. With his megaphone back, Trump would once again dominate news coverage, as outlets prove unable to resist covering him around the clock if only for financial reasons.

But this time, Trump would have advantages that he lacked in 2016 and 2020, including more loyal officials in state and local governments; the Republicans in Congress; and the backing of GOP donors, think tanks and journals of opinion. And he will have the Trump movement, including many who are armed and ready to be activated, again. Who is going to stop him then? On its current trajectory, the 2024 Republican Party will make the 2020 Republican Party seem positively defiant.

Those who criticize Biden and the Democrats for not doing enough to prevent this disaster are not being fair. There is not much they can do without Republican cooperation, especially if they lose control of either chamber in 2022. It has become fashionable to write off any possibility that a handful of Republicans might rise up to save the day. This preemptive capitulation has certainly served well those Republicans who might otherwise be held to account for their cowardice. How nice for them that everyone has decided to focus fire on Democratic Sen. Joe Manchin.

Yet it is largely upon these Republicans that the fate of the republic rests.

 Notes of the vote count taken by the staff of the House impeachment mangers are seen after the Senate voted to acquit former president Donald Trump on Capitol Hill in Washington on Feb. 13. (Salwan Georges/The Washington Post)

Seven Republican senators voted to convict Trump for inciting an insurrection and attempting to overturn a free and fair election: Richard Burr, Bill Cassidy, Susan Collins, Lisa Murkowski, Romney, Sasse and Patrick J. Toomey. It was a brave vote, a display of republican virtue, especially for the five who are not retiring in 2022. All have faced angry backlashes — Romney was booed and called a traitor at the Utah Republican convention; Burr and Cassidy were unanimously censured by their state parties. Yet as much credit as they deserve for taking this stand, it was almost entirely symbolic. When it comes to concrete action that might prevent a debacle in 2024, they have balked.

Specifically, they have refused to work with Democrats to pass legislation limiting state legislatures’ ability to overturn the results of future elections, to ensure that the federal government continues to have some say when states try to limit voting rights, to provide federal protection to state and local election workers who face threats, and in general to make clear to the nation that a bipartisan majority in the Senate opposes the subversion of the popular will. Why?

It can’t be because they think they have a future in a Trump-dominated party. Even if they manage to get reelected, what kind of government would they be serving in? They can’t be under any illusion about what a second Trump term would mean. Trump’s disdain for the rule of law is clear. His exoneration from the charges leveled in his impeachment trials — the only official, legal response to his actions — practically ensures that he would wield power even more aggressively. His experience with unreliable subordinates in his first term is likely to guide personnel decisions in a second. Only total loyalists would serve at the head of the Justice Department, FBI, CIA, National Security Agency and the Pentagon. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs will not be someone likely to place his or her own judgment above that of their civilian commander in chief. Nor would a Republican Senate fail to confirm Trump loyalists. In such a world, with Trump and his lieutenants in charge of all the levers of state power, including its growing capacity for surveillance, opposing Trump would become increasingly risky for Republicans and Democrats alike. A Trump victory is likely to mean at least the temporary suspension of American democracy as we have known it.

We are already in a constitutional crisis. The destruction of democracy might not come until November 2024, but critical steps in that direction are happening now. In a little more than a year, it may become impossible to pass legislation to protect the electoral process in 2024. Now it is impossible only because anti-Trump Republicans, and even some Democrats, refuse to tinker with the filibuster. It is impossible because, despite all that has happened, some people still wish to be good Republicans even as they oppose Trump. These decisions will not wear well as the nation tumbles into full-blown crisis.

It is not impossible for politicians to make such a leap. The Republican Party itself was formed in the 1850s by politicians who abandoned their previous party — former Whigs, former Democrats and former members of the Liberty and Free Soil parties. While Whig and Democratic party stalwarts such as Henry Clay and Stephen Douglas juggled and compromised, doing their best to ensure that the issue of slavery did not destroy their great parties, others decided that the parties had become an obstacle to justice and a threat to the nation’s continued viability.

Romney & Co. don’t have to abandon their party. They can fashion themselves as Constitutional Republicans who, in the present emergency, are willing to form a national unity coalition in the Senate for the sole purpose of saving the republic. Their cooperation with Democrats could be strictly limited to matters relating to the Constitution and elections. Or they might strive for a temporary governing consensus on a host of critical issues: government spending, defense, immigration and even the persistent covid-19 pandemic, effectively setting aside the usual battles to focus on the more vital and immediate need to preserve the United States.

It takes two, of course, to form a national unity coalition, and Democrats can make it harder or easier for anti-Trump Republicans to join. Some profess to see no distinction between the threat posed by Trump and the threat posed by the GOP. They prefer to use Trump as a weapon in the ongoing political battle, and not only as a way of discrediting and defeating today’s Republican Party but to paint all GOP policies for the past 30 years as nothing more than precursors to Trumpism. Although today’s Trump-controlled Republican Party does need to be fought and defeated, this kind of opportunistic partisanship and conspiracy-mongering, in addition to being bad history, is no cure for what ails the nation.

Senate Democrats were wise to cut down their once-massive voting rights wish list and get behind the smaller compromise measure unveiled last week by Manchin and Sen. Amy Klobuchar. But they have yet to attract any votes from their Republican colleagues for the measure. Heading into the next election, it is vital to protect election workers, same-day registration and early voting. It will also still be necessary to pass the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act, which directly addresses the state legislatures’ electoral power grab. Other battles — such as making Election Day a federal holiday and banning partisan gerrymandering — might better be postponed. Efforts to prevent a debacle in 2024 cannot. Democrats need to give anti-Trump Republicans a chance to do the right thing.

One wonders whether modern American politicians, in either party, have it in them to make such bold moves, whether they have the insight to see where events are going and the courage to do whatever is necessary to save the democratic system. If that means political suicide for this handful of Republicans, wouldn’t it be better to go out fighting for democracy than to slink off quietly into the night?

23.9.21

Bill Emmott: "La sinistra torni moderata"

di Enrico Franceschini
L'ex direttore dell’Economist Bill Emmott 
L'ex direttore dell’Economist interviene nel dibattito sul pericolo della deriva illiberale: “Gli estremismi sono funzionali solo al populismo”
LONDRA

Liberale, o meglio liberal come si dice in inglese, è un termine che ci aiuta sempre meno a descrivere quello che significa: credo che oggi ci sia bisogno di nuove definizioni politiche». Bill Emmott, giornalista e saggista britannico, interviene così nel dibattito suscitato dalla storia di copertina sul “pericolo della sinistra illiberale” pubblicata un paio di settimane fa dall’Economist, lo storico settimanale di cui è stato direttore per tredici anni, dal 1993 al 2006. «In vita mia mi hanno chiamato comunista e conservatore, quando in realtà io mi sento un autentico liberale», dice a Repubblica l’autore di Il destino dell’Occidente: come salvare la migliore idea politica della storia, pubblicato in Italia da Marsilio, «ma circolano idee diverse a seconda dei paesi e delle epoche su cosa questo voglia dire in concreto».

Cominciamo dalla cover-story dell’Economist, Emmott: esiste una sinistra illiberale?
«Penso che esista un insieme di opinioni, particolarmente tra i giovani e nelle università, che tende a porre dei limiti alla libertà di parola. Un atteggiamento che si riflette nelle polemiche sulla cosiddetta cultura della cancellazione e sugli eccessi del politicamente corretto, cioè nel tentativo di riscrivere la storia. Non credo che questo movimento possa essere identificato con determinati partiti politici, è più una forza che si manifesta all’interno della società civile, ma sicuramente influenza anche la politica».

Ed è un “pericolo”, come scrive l’Economist?
«Tutte le iniziative per sopprimere la libertà di espressione sono pericolose per chi ha a cuore la democrazia. E il pericolo, in questo caso, consiste nel fatto che ogni forma di illiberalismo, di sinistra o di destra, finisce per rafforzare le posizioni più estremistiche, creando una reazione contraria che va proprio contro quelli che sono gli interessi dichiarati di coloro che si battono per demolire una statua, proibire l’uso di un particolare termine o impedire a qualcuno di intervenire a una conferenza. La sinistra illiberale vorrebbe un mondo più equo, più giusto, migliore, ma porta involontariamente ad attacchi contro il femminismo, contro gli omosessuali e a favore del pregiudizio razziale, perché le sue iniziative appaiono esagerate, estremistiche, antistoriche, alla maggioranza della popolazione».

Si può dire che in certa misura la sinistra illiberale coincide con la sinistra radicale?
«Effettivamente coincide con quella sinistra dogmatica, intollerante, massimalista, secondo cui chi non la pensa come te è il nemico e va abbattuto. La tradizione da cui proviene la sinistra illiberale è quella: l’incapacità di dare libertà di parola anche a chi ha idee diverse dalle proprie».

A complicare le cose contribuisce il fatto che liberale o liberal ha un significato diverso in luoghi diversi.
«Certamente. In America è l’etichetta dei progressisti, che si proclamano liberal. In Gran Bretagna i liberaldemocratici sono un partito di centro, alleato talvolta con la sinistra, talvolta con la destra. In Italia il vecchio partito liberale era un partito conservatore, da sempre alleato della Democrazia Cristiana. Per non parlare di neo-liberal, la politica economica identificata con Ronald Reagan e Margaret Thatcher, in cui lo stato più leggero possibile deve lasciar fare tutto all’individuo. Purtroppo, temo che oggi il termine liberale abbia cessato di essere utile come definizione politica, perché genera troppa confusione. E mi dispiace molto dirlo, perché io mi sento per l’appunto un liberale».

Che tipo di liberale si sente di essere?
«A mio parere, un autentico liberale è colui che riconosce che lo stato può agire da freno o regolatore nei confronti dell’individuo in nome dell’interesse collettivo, ossia che ci debba essere un’armonia tra la libertà individuale e la libertà della società nel suo complesso. Alcuni liberali, viceversa, vedono il collettivo, lo stato, la società, come un avversario della libertà individuale».

La sua personale visione di liberale si avvicina forse di più a quella dei liberalsocialisti in Italia?
«Guardi, in Italia sono stato chiamato un comunista, anzi un sosia di Lenin, ai tempi del governo di Silvio Berlusconi, e un conservatore in altre circostanze. Lo ripeto, ho l’impressione che nella politica odierna ci sia bisogno di un nuovo linguaggio, per dare connotati chiari a chi si identifica con una visione sociale o con un’altra: in modo che poi si possa essere in disaccordo, ma restando almeno d’accordo su come definire le opposte forze politiche».

Ma i liberali diciamo così di sinistra e di destra non farebbero meglio a unirsi?
«In certi casi sono già dentro la stessa formazione politica, come il Partito Democratico negli Stati Uniti, al cui interno militano moderati come Joe Biden e progressisti più radicali come Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez. Lo stesso si può dire per il Labour in Gran Bretagna. Non so se vale anche per il Partito democratico italiano, perché a volte si fa un po’ fatica a capire da che parte stia, ma certamente moderati di sinistra o riformisti che dir si voglia e radicali o dogmatici di sinistra esistono pure in Italia, finendo per spaccare il fronte progressista».

In un mondo ideale dovrebbero affrontarsi alle urne liberal-conservatori e liberalsocialisti, in una sorta di eterno duello fra un John Major e un Tony Blair?
«In un mondo ideale forse sì, lo scontro più produttivo sarebbe tra moderati di destra e moderati di sinistra, ma nella realtà odierna e spesso anche in passato il populismo spinge a votare per gli estremisti di un lato e dell’altro. L’augurio è che il dibattito sulla sinistra illiberale serva a riportare i consensi popolari dell’una e dell’altra parte verso il centro, il luogo in cui tende a riconoscersi la maggioranza della gente».

14.5.21

Al mercato delle armi il Golfo compra, Israele testa e vende


Michele Giorgio, ilmanifesto 17.03.2021
Guerre future. Il rapporto dello Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri) riferisce di un eccezionale aumento dell'importazioni di armi di ogni genere da parte di alcuni paesi arabi e di tre industrie belliche israeliane tra i leader mondiali del settore
Le vendite di armi si assestano in varie regioni del mondo ma vanno sempre più forte in Medio Oriente dove sono aumentate del 25% negli ultimi quattro anni. E le esportazioni israeliane, pur rappresentando «solo» il 3% del totale globale tra il 2016 e il 2020, sono cresciute del 59% negli ultimi cinque anni. Inoltre tre giganti delle industrie militari dello Stato ebraico  Elbit Systems, IAI e Rafael Advanced Defense Systems – sono tra i leader mondiali del settore. Arabia Saudita, Qatar ed Egitto guidano la classifica dei paesi arabi che hanno aumentato l’importazione di aerei da combattimento, carri armati, sistemi missilistici. Doha addirittura fa segnare un + 361%. A riferirlo è lo Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri) nel rapporto che ha presentato lunedì che stima i volumi di trasferimenti di grandi armamenti e non il valore delle transazioni finanziarie.
Gli ultimi dati del Sipri sul commercio delle armi che sottrae ogni anno centinaia di miliardi di dollari al welfare, sanità, scuole e università in tutto il mondo, giunge mentre il Medio oriente vive un’altra delle sue fasi critiche. Il confronto tra Israele e Iran è sempre più aperto e Tel Aviv non fa mistero dei suoi piani di attacco alle centrali nucleari iraniane se gli Usa non confermerà la linea del pugno di ferro contro Tehran adottata da Donald Trump. In questi ultimi giorni è stato dato un particolare risalto ai «traguardi» della tecnologia militare israeliana. Ieri è stato annunciato l’ulteriore sviluppo del sistema anti-razzo «Iron Dome» anche contro i droni che segue il test positivo del nuovo mortaio noto come «Iron Sting». Quest’ultimo è destinato in particolare a colpire obiettivi nelle aree urbane con, affermano fonti ufficiali israeliane, «minimi danni collaterali» (i civili ammazzati) grazie all’impiego di munizioni guidate da laser e Gps. Secondo il ministro della difesa israeliano, Benny Gantz, lindustria militare nazionale è in grado di fornire alle forze armate «mezzi più letali, accurati ed efficaci». Dietro l’«Iron Sting» c’è la Elbit Systems che conquista anno dopo anno importanti fette di mercato anche in Europa. Le industrie militari israeliane hanno fatto grandi passi avanti anche in India e in altri paesi. Arriva da Israele il 69% delle importazioni di armi dellAzerbaigian che lo scorso anno ha combattuto una guerra sanguinosa contro lArmenia in cui i droni killer israeliani hanno avuto un ruolo chiave.
Comprano ogni anno armi per molte decine di miliardi di dollari le monarchie del Golfo. La prima è sempre quella saudita ma anche gli Emirati fanno la loro parte. Abu Dhabi attende solo il via libera di Joe Biden per l’acquisto, definito con la passata Amministrazione Usa, di 50 caccia F-35 di quinta generazione. In Nordafrica a recitare la parte del leone è l’Egitto che ha aumentato le sue importazioni di armi del 136% tra il 2011-15 e il 2016-20. La Turchia di Erdogan ora compra molto di meno, si è messa in proprio e sta sviluppando rapidamente la sua produzione militare, in particolare di droni che hanno già dimostrato la loro letale efficacia nel conflitto siriano e, come quelli israeliani, nella guerra tra Azerbaigian e Armenia. Si affida, a causa dell’embargo, quasi esclusivamente alle sue industrie militari anche lIran che in segreto fornisce ai ribelli yemeniti Houthi missili e droni per attaccare lArabia Saudita oltre ad assicurare i rifornimenti per l’arsenale del movimento sciita libanese Hezbollah.
Vendono sempre più armi le potenze occidentali, in calo Cina e Russia. Pechino, quinta al mondo al mondo dal 2016-20, ha visto diminuire le sue esportazioni di armi del 7,8% tra il 2011-15 e il 2016-20. L’Italia è scesa al decimo posto della classifica mondiale ma è il secondo paese esportatore verso la Turchia e il terzo verso il Pakistan e Israele, tutti e tre coinvolti in conflitti armati. Senza dimenticare le vendite di armi italiane all’Egitto, tra cui di recente una fregata, nonostante la ferma opposizione della società civile per l’assassinio di Giulio Regeni. Tra i cinque big che da soli assorbono il 76% del mercato  Stati Uniti, Russia, Francia, Germania e Cina Parigi è quella che ha registrato il maggior incremento (+44%).

13.5.21

Sul disegno di legge Zan

Tamar Pitch

Articolo pubblicato su “Studi sulla questione criminale” il 06.05.2021.

Io non sono una fan della moltiplicazione dei reati e tantomeno dell’uso del diritto penale per il suo potenziale simbolico (e pedagogico). Dunque, ho storto il naso anche per la legge Mancino sulla criminalizzazione dei discorsi d’odio e di incitazione alla violenza per motivi razziali, etnici o nazionali. Però, questi reati ci sono già in parecchi ordinamenti, e l’estensione di questa criminalizzazione ai discorsi d’odio per orientamento sessuale e identità di genere (così, testualmente, chiamata in vari documenti internazionali) è stata richiesta più volte da organismi, appunto internazionali (cfr. per esempio, al Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, UN General Assembly, 12 July 2018, o la Risoluzione adottata dal Consiglio dei diritti umani, 30 giugno, 2016, intitolata Protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity) E poi, forse, talvolta, il potenziale simbolico e pedagogico del diritto può venir utile: la violenza e il bullismo verso chi è percepito/a come omosessuale o transgender è in Italia una vera piaga, e io apprezzo che questo ddl instauri una giornata contro l’omolesbotransfobia, soprattutto se in questa giornata di tutto questo si parlerà nelle scuole.

Qui, però, vorrei occuparmi soltanto delle obiezioni che a questo ddl sono state avanzate da alcune femministe e persone che si dichiarano parte della sinistra. Soprattutto, ma non solo, in un appello che ha raccolto parecchie firme, e che a me sembra sconcertante per confusione, pochezza argomentativa, contraddittorietà interna, scarsa conoscenza giuridica, per non parlare dell’ignoranza totale rispetto ad altri saperi, compresa la filosofia prodotta da molto femminismo.

In sintesi, questo appello dice che sì, va bene una legge contro i discorsi d’odio nei confronti di omosessuali, lesbiche e transessuali (sic), ma non va bene che si nomini l’identità di genere, perché cancellerebbe la differenza sessuale, il cui riconoscimento giuridico è una vittoria delle donne, e perché introdurrebbe una “fluidità di genere” foriera di un piano inclinato in cui si finirebbe per legittimare la prostituzione e la gestazione per altri, nonché si darebbe luogo a una “confusione antropologica”.

Ora, mi chiedo: dove sarebbe questo riconoscimento giuridico della differenza sessuale? E perché sarebbe “una vittoria delle donne”? Dal testo è chiaro che lì differenza sessuale indica uno spartiacque biologico: da una parte le femmine, dall’altra i maschi, biologicamente intesi (dunque, una interpretazione del concetto di differenza sessuale che niente ha a che vedere con la tradizione italiana del pensiero della differenza). Nel nostro ordinamento giuridico questa differenza (biologica) si può certamente trovare, ma non mi pare proprio in conseguenza di una vittoria del movimento delle donne. In costituzione, per esempio, si dice all’art.37 che le condizioni di lavoro della donna “devono consentire l’adempimento della sua essenziale funzione familiare”. Si intende questo? La 194, dovuta (anche) alle mobilitazioni del movimento delle donne, certo presuppone la differenza biologica tra maschi e femmine, ma non la nomina. La legge contro la violenza sessuale, anche questa richiesta dai movimenti delle donne, è, come tutte le leggi penali (stalking compreso), declinata al neutro. Parità, pari opportunità, quote “rosa” nominano semmai il genere.

E che cosa si intende con “confusione antropologica”? Sembra evidente che ci si rifaccia qui ad una antropologia, ossia ad una visione dell’umano, particolare: ossia a quella della tradizione giudaico-cristiana, secondo cui “uomo e donna li creò”. Però, appunto, è una visione particolare, relativa a una specifica cultura in un certo momento storico. Di “antropologie” ne esistono molte altre, come dovrebbe sapersi. Per esempio, vi sono state e vi sono culture che riconoscono non due, ma tre o quattro generi…

Si dice poi che nominare il sesso assieme a orientamento sessuale, identità di genere, disabilità, ecc. porta a definire le donne come un’altra minoranza da tutelare, dove le donne una minoranza non sono. Da quando “sesso” equivale a “donne”? Semmai ci si dovrebbe preoccupare del fatto che con questo ddl anche un uomo, che si identifica come “uomo”, eterosessuale può invocare qualche discriminazione sofferta, appunto, in quanto uomo eterosessuale. Se invece “sesso” significa qui “misoginia” (però non c’è scritto), beh allora l’odio (e la paura) nei confronti delle donne e del femminile va di pari passo con l’odio (e la paura) verso le sessualità non conformi, assimilate appunto al femminile, minacciose le une e le altre di una “virilità”, una identità maschile tradizionale, assai traballante.

Naturalmente, il ddl Zan nulla dice rispetto a prostituzione e gpa, essendo un ddl che vuole colpire i discorsi d’odio, così che questa storia del piano inclinato, del pendio scivoloso, cui nominare l’identità di genere condurrebbe ha a che fare soltanto, penso, con le fantasie e gli incubi dei e delle sottoscrittrici di questo appello.

Voglio però dire qualcosa sul “genere”, su che cosa questa parola indichi, perché mi sembra di vederne vari fraintendimenti, sia da parte di chi la osteggia in nome del “sesso”, sia da chi la depreca perché “abbiamo fatto tanti sforzi per decostruirlo, il ‘genere’, per liberarcene, ed ecco che ora torna?”. Da quando questo termine è stato introdotto, per indicare gli aspetti, e le aspettative, sociali e culturali attribuiti storicamente a chi viene definito donna e uomo, cosa che è avvenuta attorno alla fine degli anni 60 del secolo scorso (con buona pace di chi, richiamandosi all’art.3 Cost. afferma che la Costituzione non lo nomina!), da parte di storiche e sociologhe, il dibattito non si è mai fermato e la letteratura che se ne occupa è enorme.

Ripeto qui quanto ho scritto molte volte: considero il genere un’istituzione sociale che, lungo i secoli e in buona parte (ma non ovunque) nel mondo, divide gli umani in due grandi categorie, i maschi e le femmine, attribuendo caratteristiche diverse agli uni e alle altre, dove quelle dei maschi sono valutate superiori a quelle delle femmine, instaurando così una gerarchia tra le due categorie e imponendo l’eterosessualità come la modalità “normale”, se non l’unica, di rapporto tra loro. Ciò che abbiamo decostruito non è il “genere”, ma questa declinazione del genere, così aprendo la via per molti e diversi modi di “farlo” (cfr. Butler). Perché non è che ci si possa spogliare della cultura, così magari trovando qualche essenza vera “al disotto” della cultura stessa. Non c’è un fuori dalle istituzioni, non c’è un fuori dalla cultura: noi siamo indissolubilmente natura e cultura, i nostri corpi sono insieme biologia e storia, la nostra percezione di noi stessi (la nostra identità) si forma nell’interazione con altri significativi, dunque attraverso il linguaggio. La decostruzione dell’istituzione genere, così come l’abbiamo conosciuta nell’ultimo secolo, produce non la scomparsa del genere, ma modi diversi e plurali di intenderlo e praticarlo. Perché, è bene precisarlo, non solo donne (e uomini) si diventa, ma anche umani si diventa: non c’è umanità al di fuori delle relazioni sociali entro cui ci formiamo, non c’è umanità fuori da una (qualsiasi) cultura.

Mi domando poi perché si parla sempre e soltanto di persone nate con un corredo biologico maschile che transitano verso una identità di genere femminile, e mai del contrario. Insomma perché le donne nate biologicamente tali temono di venir soppiantate da maschi che si dichiarano donne (!), ma gli uomini nati biologicamente tali non sembrano altrettanto spaventati dall’idea di persone nate biologicamente femmine che transitano verso una identità di genere maschile?

La differenza biologica tra maschi e femmine sembra rilevare semmai rispetto alla procreazione, giacché solo le donne partoriscono. Ossia, solo gli esseri umani dotati di utero possono portare avanti una gravidanza. Per ora, certamente, è così. Oggi, però, ci sono esseri umani dotati di utero che si dichiarano maschi (e che tali sembrano a tutti gli effetti, almeno secondo le convenzioni fisiche vigenti). Sono persone, identificate come femmine alla nascita, che a un certo punto decidono di diventare “maschi”, ossia di percorrere un itinerario fisico e culturale che le porta ad identificarsi come “maschi”, e che, però, scelgono di conservare alcune caratteristiche biologiche proprie delle femmine, ossia l’utero. Sulla base di ciò che viene chiamato identità di genere, siamo dunque in presenza di uomini che possono partorire. (Perché non vi sia polemica sulle “donne” che diventano “uomini”, pur mantenendo l’apparato riproduttivo femminile, sarebbe questione da capir meglio).

Ovviamente, questo esempio corrobora chi sostiene che, dal punto di vista biologico, ci sono solo maschi e femmine (con l’eccezione delle persone intersex, le quali sono però un’infima minoranza). L’identità di genere si può pure scegliere, ma solo chi ha un certo corredo cromosomico, e i relativi organi che ne sono la conseguenza, può in effetti partorire.

Insomma, ha un senso cercare di stabilire la “verità” dei nostri corpi nella biologia e/o nella cultura quando si tratta di individuare regole giuridiche?

O anche, che rilevanza hanno o devono avere il sesso biologico oppure l’identità di genere per il diritto?

La risposta potrebbe essere: dipende dal bene o diritto che si vuole tutelare, dai comportamenti che si vogliono proibire, e così via.

Nel caso della legge Zan, ad esempio, si vogliono proibire comportamenti che discriminano o istigano alla violenza nei confronti di persone individuate, da chi commette il reato, sulla base della loro identità di genere: qui identità di genere sta ad indicare il genere scelto dalla persona in questione (dopo un percorso medico e psicologico difficile e complesso), che differisce o può differire rispetto al genere attribuito alla nascita.

Il sesso biologico, invece, fa davvero la differenza rispetto alla procreazione e dunque al diritto e ai diritti che la concernono. Solo, dicevamo, persone provviste di utero possono, per ora almeno, portare avanti una gravidanza e partorire. Ciò che equivale a dire che tra femmine (biologiche) e maschi vi è un’asimmetria insuperabile rispetto alla procreazione: le femmine normalmente fertili per riprodursi hanno bisogno solo di una goccia di sperma, i maschi hanno bisogno di una o più femmine in carne e ossa, ossia di utero e di ovociti. A lungo, e per certi versi ancora, nella nostra cultura, questa asimmetria biologica è stata culturalmente e socialmente interpretata alla rovescia, ossia privilegiando la paternità rispetto alla maternità, conferendo dunque diritti riproduttivi al padre (ossia al marito della madre, che fosse o no il padre biologico): patria potestas, trasmissione del cognome, designazione come capofamiglia. Rafforzati dalla criminalizzazione dell’aborto volontario e dalla stigmatizzazione delle cosiddette madri singole. La contraccezione e, specialmente, l’approvazione prima della riforma del diritto di famiglia e poi della legalizzazione dell’aborto volontario (a certe condizioni), nonché il mutamento socio culturale avvenuto, anche grazie ai movimenti femministi, negli ultimi 50 anni hanno certamente cambiato questa situazione, ma non radicalmente e nemmeno in maniera irreversibile.

Dunque, direi, calma e gesso please: il ddl Zan non è un attentato nei confronti delle donne dotate di utero e vagina, men che meno è un attentato nei confronti della maternità (che in molti commenti soi-disant femministi contrari a questo ddl sembra essere diventata il nucleo, il nocciolo duro, del “femminile”: curioso, invece, come in questo modo ci si allei con i veri attentatori alla libertà femminile, quelli che militano contro la 194 e per il ritorno alla famigliola tradizionale, quelli che hanno votato la famigerata legge sulla procreazione medicalmente assistita). Questo ddl ha una portata molto più modesta: estendere ad alcuni soggetti le tutele già accordate ad altre minoranze dalla legge Mancino.

Ultimo punto: non esistono “le donne” e “gli uomini”, esistono donne (e uomini) ricche e povere, bianche, nere, gialle, verdi, giovani e vecchie, e via dicendo. “Le donne” non sono un gruppo sociale: sono, semmai, quando si organizzano in quanto donne, un soggetto politico, altrettanto plurale quanto plurali sono le differenze e le disuguaglianze all’interno di questo soggetto.

Leggi anche: Ida Dominijanni, Gli effetti collaterali della legge Zan.